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Eighty men, spread equally across four groups were recruited: men with and without 
intellectual disabilities (IDs) who were either offenders or non-offenders.  Participants 
completed measures of moral reasoning, empathy and distorted cognitions.   The 
results indicated that the moral reasoning abilities of offenders with IDs were 
developmentally delayed, but yet were still more mature than those of non-offenders 
with IDs.  Offenders without IDs had less mature moral reasoning abilities than non-
offenders without IDs.   The differences may be partially accounted for by intellectual 
ability.  The results also indicated that the relationship between empathy and distorted 
cognitions is mediated by moral reasoning.  The findings have implications for the use 
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The relationships between moral reasoning, empathy and distorted cognitions 
amongst men with intellectual disabilities and a history of criminal offending: A 
comparison study 
Piaget (1932) is often credited as the first to consider the moral development 
of children from a psychological perspective.  Later, Kohlberg (1969, 1976) revised 
Piagetian theory and extended the theory beyond childhood and into adolescence and 
into adulthood.   However,  his  theory has been criticised for being cultural biased 
(Simpson, 1974), and based on Western liberalism (Schweder, 1982; Sullivan, 1977).  
Others have noted that the theory appears based on masculinist conceptualisations of 
morality (Gilligan, 1982), while others have commented that the theory does not 
consider emotion (Sullivan, 1977).   More recently, Krebs and Denton (2005) have 
DUJXHGWKDWLQFRQWUDVWWR.RKOEHUJ¶VSURSRVDOVPRUDOUHDVRQLQJLVQRWVWUXFWXUDOO\
consistent across all contexts.   Some of these criticisms led Gibbs (1979, 2003, 2010) 
to revise Kohlbergian theory into a sociomoral stage theory (Table 1). Other 
perspectives have also been adopted, placing moral development within the social 
(Semetana, 1999; Turiel, 1983, 2002) or emotional (Eisenberg, Reykowski, & Staub, 
1989; Hoffman, 2000) domains. 
Insert Table 1 About Here 
 
Although there are some differences between these theoretical approaches, 
both Gibbs  (1979, 2003, 2010) and Hoffman (2000) argue that empathy is an 
important emotion that relates to moral reasoning and behaviour.  However, Hoffman 
(2000) considers empathy as the primary motivator of moral behaviour, and argues 
that this relationship is affected by moral reasoning or principles.  Hoffman (2000) 






suggests that moral principles are activated by empathy, and empathy can become 
HPEHGGHGZLWKLQRU³ERQGHG´ZLWKPRUDOSULQFLSOHV,QWXUQPRUDOSULQFLSOHVDUH
augmented by empathic states and therefore affect behavioural responses.   He further 
argues that this ERQGLQJOHDGVWRWKHFUHDWLRQRI³«KRWFRJQLWLRQV- cognitive 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQVFKDUJHGZLWKHPSDWKLFDIIHFWWKXVJLYLQJWKHPPRWLYHIRUFH´
(Hoffman, 2000; p. 239).   
Gibbs (2003; 2010) equally recognises that empathy may motivate moral 
behaviour, but it may not be the primary motivator of moral behaviour: he argues that 
moral principles also motivate moral behaviour in their own right.  Gibbs (2003, 
2010) FRQVLGHUV+RIIPDQ¶VWKHRU\DVRQHRI³DIIHFWLYHSULPDF\´DQGLQVWHDG
DUJXHVIRUDPRGHORI³FR-SULPDF\´ZKere both empathy and moral principles 
motivate moral behaviour.  Nevertheless, both the theories of Gibbs and Hoffmann 
recognise that cognition and empathy may be augmented by each other, and that 
cognitions stem from moral schema.   
Unfortunately, the advances in moral development theory have not explicitly 
considered people with intellectual disabilities (IDs), and in an attempt to address this 
shortcoming, Langdon, Clare and Murphy (2010a) undertook a structured review of 
the literature regarding the moral development of people with IDs.  They concluded 
that the moral development of children, adolescents and adults with IDs tends to occur 
at a slower pace than that of typically developing individuals.  These differences in 
the rate of development may disappear when cognitive ability is controlled.  Langdon 
et al. (2010a) stressed that their conclusions must be preliminary because many of the 




existing studies made use of measures of moral reasoning that were idiosyncratic and 
unstandardised. 
 In an attempt to address the issues highlighted by their review, Langdon, 
Murphy, Clare and Palmer (2010b) examined the psychometric properties of two 
different moral reasoning measures.   They presented  the Moral Theme Inventory 
(MTI; Narvaez, Gleason, Mitchell, & Bentley, 1999), a recognition instrument, and 
the Socio-Moral Reflection Measure ± Short Form (SRM-SF; Gibbs, Basinger, & 
Fuller, 1992), a production instrument, to men with and without IDs of similar age 
and with no known history of arrests, cautions or convictions.  They reported that, for 
men with IDs, the two-week test-retest reliability of the MTI was poor, while it was 
good for the SRM-SF.  They also found that the moral reasoning abilities of men with 
IDs were less developed than those of their counterparts without IDs and that the 
differences could be partially accounted for by intellectual ability.   Nevertheless, 
even when IQ was controlled, differences between the two groups remained in 
relation to moral reasoning about the law. The scores of men with IDs fell within a 
transition stage between stages 1 and 2 (Table 1).  
In a subsequent paper, Langdon, Clare and Murphy (2011) suggested that the 
relationship between moral reasoning and illegal behaviour may be moderated by 
intellectual functioning and that this relationship may approximate an inverted U-
curve.  Based on these proposed relationships, the moral reasoning of men with IDs 
and no history of engaging in illegal behaviour should be developmentally immature. 
Moral justifications at the early stages are based upon unilateral authority or 
avoidance of punishment and so such individuals should be less likely to engage in 
illegal behaviour. In contrast, as a group, individuals with a history of engaging in 
illegal behaviour should be more likely to have ³ERUGHUOLQH´LQWHOOHFWXDOIXQFWLRQLQJ




and more mature moral reasoning, but this reasoning is still developmentally 
immature, and should fall within the stages associated with meeting RQH¶VRZQQHHGV.    
There is considerable evidence that moral reasoning is related to offending 
behaviour amongst young offenders (Blasi, 1980; Nelson, Smith, & Dodd, 1990; 
Stams et al., 2006).  From a theoretical perspective,  Gibbs (2003, 2010) has argued 
that young offenders have immature moral judgement, distorted cognitions and social 
skills deficits that interact and lead to illegal behaviour.  Illegal behaviour is then 
driven by cognitive distortions that are generated by the development of schema 
UHIOHFWLQJWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VPRUDOVWDJH7KLVDFFRXQWKDVEHHQHODERUDWHGE\3DOPHU
(2003a, 2003b), who embedded moral reasoning within a developmental theory 
incorporating parental and peer influence, information processing, and social and 
environmental factors.  Like Gibbs (2003, 2010), Palmer (2003a, 2003b) proposed 
that immature moral reasoning leads to the generation of cognitive distortions, used 
by an individual to support his or her  illegal behaviour, and reduce empathy.  She 
thereby provided a theoretical link between moral reasoning theory and behaviour that 
is against the law.  
Given the evidence of a relationship between illegal behaviour and immature 
moral reasoning amongst young offenders, we undertook this study to investigate the 
moral reasoning abilities of offenders with and without IDs.  The purpose of the study 
was twofold.  First, we aimed to examine the moral reasoning abilities of offenders 
with and without IDs and compare these abilities to those of non-offenders with and 
without IDs.  We hypothesised that the moral reasoning abilities of non-offenders 
with IDs should be more limited than offenders with IDs.  Among those without IDs, 
offenders should have more immature moral reasoning than non-offenders.  Secondly, 
based on the theoretical relationships between moral reasoning, distorted cognitions 




and empathy (Gibbs, 2003, 2010; Hoffman, 2000), we examined whether the 
relationship between empathy and distorted cognitions would be mediated by moral 




Eighty men were recruited from the East of England (UK) and allocated to 
four groups: 1) men with IDs and no self-reported known history of arrests, cautions 
or convictions  (M IQ=58.8, SD=5.87; M Age=45.35; SD=16.57) formed the IDs-
Group, 2) men with IDs and a documented history of at least one Crown Court 
conviction that led to a custodial sentence (M IQ=62.9, SD=5.22; M Age=33.60, 
SD=7.54) formed the IDs-Offender Group, 3) men without IDs with a documented 
history of at least one Crown Court conviction that led to a custodial sentence (M 
IQ=89.50, SD=11.12; M Age=38.80; SD=15.20) formed the Comparison-Offender 
Group and 4) men without IDs with no known history of arrests, cautions or 
convictions as determined by self-report (M IQ=103.25, SD=5.77; M Age=38.70; 
SD=12.99) formed the Comparison-Group.   
The specific inclusion criteria were: a) all participants should be men because 
there is some evidence that men and women make moral judgements differently 
(Gilligan, 1982; Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983, 1984; Walker, 1995), b) the Full 
Scale IQ score of participants within the IDs and IDs-Offender Groups should be 
below 70, with associated difficulties with adaptive behaviour (considered to be 
present if the person was receiving support from specialist services for health and/or 
social care), and these difficulties should have had an onset before the age of 18 




(American Psychiatric Association, 2000), c) the Full Scale IQ score of participants in 
the Comparison and Comparison-Offender Groups should be greater than 70, and d) 
offenders should have committed an indictable offence which had been dealt with by 
a Crown Court. Offenders who had tried by a Crown Court were included because, in 
England, these are used to deal with more severe offences (attracting a custodial 
sentence of more than six months).    
Design  
A 2 (Factor IDs: IDs vs No IDs) X 2 (Factor Offence: Offending vs No 
Offending) between-subjects design was used.  Initially, all participants completed the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - IIIUK (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1998) to assess their 
general intellectual functioning.  Participants then completed the Sociomoral 
Reflection Measure-Short Form (SRM-SF; Gibbs et al., 1992), a measure of moral 
reasoning; the Bryant Empathy Index (BEI; Bryant, 1982), which is a measure of 
emotional empathy; and finally, a measure of distorted cognitions, the How I Think 
Questionnaire (Barriga, Gibbs, Potter, & Liau, 2001).   
Measures 
Offence Data.  Information about convictions was initially sought from the 
research participant directly and consent was obtained to verify disclosures by 
referencing records.  In order to account for the difficulties with indexing convictions 
simply by frequency, without taking severity into account, offence data were ranked 
in terms of severity by drawing on the findings of Francis, Soothill and Dittrich 
(2001) who used a paired-comparisons method to devise an offence seriousness score.  
Similar methods have been used more recently in the United States (Ramchand, 
Macdonald, Haviland, & Morral, 2009).  As a consequence, offence data from 




participants were assigned a severity score on the basis of the data presented by 
Francis et al. (2001), and the offence with the highest severity score for each 
participant was ranked in ascending order (higher ranks indicate greater severity).   
General Intellectual Functioning. The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - 
IIIUK (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1998) was used to assess the general intellectual 
functioning of participants.  The WAIS-III is a well developed reliable and valid 
measure of general intelligence that has been standardised on a British population.  
Reliability coefficients for the WAIS-III IQ scales range from 0.88 to 0.97 (Tulskey, 
Zhu, & Ledbetter, 1997).   The WAIS-III yields three different IQ scores; Verbal IQ, 
Performance IQ and Full Scale IQ.  Full Scale IQ is an aggregate of the Verbal and 
Performance IQ scores and represents global intellectual functioning.  
Moral Reasoning.  The Sociomoral Reflection Measure (SRM-SF) is a 
production measure of moral reasoning (Gibbs et al., 1992) and has been shown to 
possess high levels of test-retest reliability (r=0.88; Gibbs et al., 1992), and excellent 
internal consistency Į *LEEVHWDO.  Langdon et al. (2010b) 
demonstrated that the SRM-SF has substantial internal consistency and good test-
retest reliability when used with men with IDs.   The SRM-SF appears valid as it is 
positively correlated with the Moral Judgement Interview, and discriminates between 
children of differing chronological ages, as well aVEHWZHHQµGHOLQTXHQW¶DQGµQRQ-
GHOLQTXHQW¶DGROHVFHQWV(Gibbs et al., 1992).   
The SRM-SF comprises eleven questions, and generally takes about twenty 
minutes to present.  The questions relate to the following seven constructs, a) Contract 
(questions one to three), b) Truth (question four), c) Affiliation (questions five and 
six), d) Life (questions seven and eight), e) Property (question nine), f) Law (question 




ten), and g) Legal Justice (question eleven).  Each question is relatively brief, and 
invites the respondent first to consider the importance of behaving in a certain 
manner, or making a certain decision, within the context of a forced choice.  For 
H[DPSOHZKHQDVNHGWKHTXHVWLRQ³7KLQNDERXWZKHQ\RX¶YHPDGHDSURPLVHWRD
friend of yours.  How important is it for people to keep promises, if they can, to their 
IULHQGV"´WKHUHVSRQGHQWLVDVNHGWRFKRRVHZKHWKHUWKis is very important, important, 
or not important.   Next, respondents are asked to consider further by answering the 
IROORZLQJTXHVWLRQ³:K\LVWKDWYHU\LPSRUWDQWLPSRUWDQWQRWLPSRUWDQW"´
Respondents write their answers on the questionnaire, or give them orally to be 
recorded by the interviewer.  All answers from the IDs-Group were recorded by the 
interviewer.  
Verbatim answers are scored according to a set of complex rules and 
heuristics, and the development of proficient and reliable scoring occurs through the 
use of practice scoring material (Gibbs et al., 1992).  Responses to each question are 
assigned a developmental rating which corresponds to a moral stage associated with 
*LEE¶V6RFLR-Moral Reasoning Theory.  At least seven of the eleven questions must 
be answered with scoreable material in order for a questionnaire to be scored reliably.  
Once a developmental rating is assigned to each question, it is converted to a number 
(e.g. a developmental rating of 1 corresponds to moral Stage 1, and is assigned the 
numerical value 1). Scores across all the questions are then summed and the mean is 
calculated and multiplied by 100, yielding a possible score of 100 to 400.  As shown 
LQ7DEOHWKHVHVFRUHVFRUUHVSRQGWRDSHUVRQ¶VJOREDOPRUDOVWDJH$GGLWLRQDOO\
moral stage ratings can be generated for each of the seven constructs examined by the 
SRM-SF: The scores generated across these constructs are interpreted using Table 2. 
The inter-rater reliability of the scoring of the SRM-SF was also calculated using an 




expert rater (EP) who scored a random sample of 19% (n=15) of completed 




Insert Table 2 About Here 
 
 Empathy.  The Bryant Empathy Index  (BEI; Bryant, 1982) is a twenty-two 
item measure of emotional empathy.  The scale was designed for use with children 
and adolescents to measure emotional empathy in a trait-like manner.  Bryant (1982) 
demonstrated that the BEI had good to excellent test-retest reliability, and adequate to 
substantial internal consistency. One of the difficulties associated with measuring 
empathy amongst people with and without IDs is that there is no measure of empathy 
that can be satisfactorily used with both groups. The BEI was considered as a measure 
that might be suitable because it is short, relatively easy to understand, and responses 
to items are coded as simply Yes or No.  However, some of the items are potentially 
inappropriate for use with adults and some minor modification to items was therefore 
UHTXLUHG)RUH[DPSOHVRPHRIWKHLWHPVPDNHUHIHUHQFHWR³ER\V´RU³JLUOV´DQG
WKHVHZRUGVZHUHUHSODFHGZLWK³PHQ´RU³ZRPHQ´'HWDLOVRIWKHRULJLQDOLWHPV
contained within the BEI, and the revised items, are found in Table 3.   As a 
consequence of these revisions, the internal consistency and split-half reliability of the 
BEI was calculated.  The internal consistency of the BEI was found to be k=0.64.  
Insert Table 3 About Here 




 Cognitive Distortions. The How I Think (HIT) Questionnaire (Barriga et al., 
2001) is a measure of cognitive distortions based upon the four-categories proposed 
by Gibbs and colleagues (Gibbs, 1991, 1993; Gibbs, Potter, & Goldstein, 1995).  
These are: a) Self-Centred, b) Blaming Others, c) Minimizing/Mislabelling, and d) 
Assuming the Worst.  The HIT has 54 items and respondents are asked to indicate 
their degree of agreement along a six-SRLQWVFDOHIURP³DJUHHVWURQJO\´WR³GLVDJUHH
VWURQJO\´7RWDODQGPHDQVFRUHVDUHGHULYHGIRUWKHIRXU-categories of distorted 
thinking as well as four behavioural referent subscales: a) Opposition-Defiance, b) 
Physical Aggression, c) Lying and d) Stealing.  An Anomalous Responding scale is 
also calculated, along with three Summary Scales: a) Overt Scale, b) Covert Scale, 
and c) Total Score.  The Overt Scale is calculated from the Opposition-Defiance and 
Physical Aggression subscales, while the Covert Scale is calculated from the Lying 
and Stealing subscales.  The Total Score is calculated from all subscales.   Barriga et 
al. (2001) reported that confirmatory factor analysis supported the structure of the 
HIT.  The internal consistency of the HIT has been reported to range from 0.63 to 
0.96, and the measure has been shown to possess convergent, divergent and 
discriminant validity (Barriga et al., 2001).   
Procedure 
 Following the receipt of a favourable ethical opinion from the Hertfordshire 
NHS Research Ethics Committee, information about the study was disseminated in 
different ways to participants who were likely to have capacity to give or withhold 
consent to participation.   
For the IDs-Group, managers of day services and community intellectual 
disabilities teams were contacted directly, and informed of the project.  They were 




asked to distribute information leaflets to men with IDs using their services.   They 
were specifically directed not to share information regarding the study with anyone 
using their service whom they knew to have a history of arrests, cautions or 
convictions.  Any man who expressed an interest in taking part was asked to alert his 
keyworker, who then informed the relevant manager.  The manager then contacted the 
researcher (PEL) to inform him of the number of possible participants at a site, and a 
mutually convenient time was arranged to attend the site and speak to potential 
participants. Once someone indicated that he might like to take part, full information 
about the study was provided, and if he wished to take part, written consent was 
sought..    
 The IDs-Offender Group was recruited by contacting medium-secure 
hospitals in the East of England and gaining permission to share information about the 
study with potential participants who were known to have IDs and a history of 
criminal offending.   All men were detained in hospital under the Mental Health Act 
2003 (amended 2007).  Any men who expressed an interest in taking part were asked 
to inform a member of staff who contacted the researcher.  The researcher than met 
with the potential participant and further information about the study was provided, 
and again, written consent was sought from those who expressed a wish to take part.  
The Comparison-Offender Group was recruited through the National 
Probation Service in the East of England.   Information about the study was shared 
with Probation Services who passed information to individuals who met the inclusion 
criteria.  Any potential participants who expressed an interest in taking part were 
advised to share this information with a member of staff, who then contacted the 
researcher.   The researcher than met with the potential participant and further 




information about the study was provided. Participants who wished to take part were 
asked to provide written consent.   
Finally, information about the study was disseminated to the Comparison-
Group in several different ways.  Information sheets were distributed by their 
managers to men employed within a university in a non-academic position.  
Information about the study was also disseminated using an advertisement email 
system at this university.  Participants were asked not to volunteer for the study if they 
had a history of arrests, cautions or convictions.  Interested participants were invited 
to contact the researcher directly, and written consent was given by those who wished 
to take part.   
No participant was included if he appeared to lack capacity to take part or 
withheld consent .  Participants in all of the four groups were given £10.00 in 
shopping vouchers as a token of appreciation.  
Data Preparation and Analysis 
 All data were entered into a database and analysed using PASW Statistics 
Version 18.0.2.  Descriptive data were generated and examined, and any possible 
errors were checked and corrected as appropriate.   Data were inspected for departures 
from normality by visual inspection of histograms and the generation of P-P plots.  
No variables departed substantially from normality, with the exception of the seven 
constructs assessed using the SRM-SF; however, the overall SRM-SF score was not 
affected.  As a consequence of the non-normal data, we made use of bootstrapping 
with 5000 samples with replacement, within ANOVA and ANCOVA, using 
appropriate post-hoc testing.  Parameter estimates for each model were determined 
and bias corrected and accelerated (BCa) confidence intervals were calculated.  The F 




statistic reported in the Results was derived using the original data, while the 
significance level and the 95% BCa confidence interval were derived using 
bootstrapping.  If the BCa confidence interval does not include zero, then differences 
are considered to be statistically significant at p<0.05. 
 In order to examine the relationships between moral reasoning, empathy and 
distorted cognitions, we followed the recommendations of Baron and Kenny (1986) 
for investigating mediation, but we also made use of appropriate methods for 
investigating mediation in small samples.  Hayes (2009) has argued that bootstrapping 
procedures are more appropriate than parametric statistics for investigating the 
indirect effect within mediation models because assumptions regarding normality are 
not necessary and these methods are more powerful.  As a consequence, we made use 
of the methods and macros described by Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008) for 
investigating mediation models using bootstrapping.  For each of the two simple 
mediation models we examined, we generated 5000 bootstrap samples.  BCa 
confidence intervals were calculated and are reported in order to examine the 
significance of the indirect effect within each model.   
  






In relation to age, the initial analysis revealed that there was no significant 
main effect of IDs (F(1, 79)=<1, p=0.589; BCa 95% CI=-3.40 to 1.93), or Offence 
(F(1, 79)=3.20, p=0.079; BCa 95% CI=-5.22 to 0.21), but the interaction was 
significant (F(1, 79)=5.83, p=0.018; BCa 95% CI=0.61 to 5.94) (Table 4).  Posthoc 
testing revealed that the IDs-Group were significantly older than both the IDs-
Offender Group (p=0.007; BCa 95% CI=4.26 to 19.24) and the Comparison-Group 
(p=0.049; BCa 95% CI=0.25 to 16.17), while there were no significant differences 
between the other groups (p>0.05).    
There was no significant difference in offence severity between the IDs-
Offender and the Comparison-Offender group (z=-0.22, p=0.83).   For intellectual 
functioning, as expected, those with IDs scored significantly lower on the WAIS-III 
than those without IDs (F(1, 79)=461.60, p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=16.17 to 19.37).  
Offenders also scored significantly lower than non-offenders (F(1, 79)=8.52, p=0.006; 
BCa 95% CI=-4.07 to -0.76).  There was a significant interaction between the factor 
IDs and Offence (F(1, 79)=29.14, p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=-6.12 to -2.77).  Posthoc 
analysis revealed that there was a significant difference between all the groups 
(p<0.05; Table 4).    
Insert Table 4 About Here 
Empathy and Distorted Cognitions 
For empathy, participants with IDs scored significantly lower on the BEI than 
those without IDs (F(1, 79)=12.00, p=0.002; BCa 95% CI=0.51 to 1.82), while neither 
the difference between offenders and non-offenders (F(1, 79)=<1, p=0.88; BCa 95% 




CI=-0.71 to 0.61) nor the interaction (F(1, 79)=2.17, p=0.145; BCa 95% CI=-0.18 to 
1.18) was significant.  However, posthoc analysis indicated that the IDs-Group scored 
significantly lower (p=0.013; BCa 95% CI=-3.22 to -0.57) than the Comparison-
Offender Group.  The IDs-Offender Group also scored significantly lower than both 
the Comparison-Offender Group (p=0.002; BCa 95% CI=-5.31 to -1.45), and the 
Comparison-Group (p=0.023; BCa 95% CI=-4.43 to -0.36).  Differences between the 
other groups were not significant (p>0.05; Table 4).   
On the HIT, the measure of distorted cognitions, there was no significant main 
effect for IDs with respect to the Anomalous Responding (F(1, 79)=3.81, p=0.06; BCa 
95% CI=-0.01 to 0.41), Self-Centred (F(1, 79)=1.68, p=0.19; BCa 95% CI=-0.28 to 
0.06), or Lying (F(1, 79)=<1, p=0.375; BCa 95% CI=-0.25 to 0.09) subscales, and the 
Covert scale (F(1, 79)=3.48, p=0.065; BCa 95% CI=-0.29 to 0.01; Table 4).   
However, men with IDs scored significantly higher than men without IDs on the 
Blaming Others (F(1, 79)=17.16, p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=-0.51 to -0.19), 
Minimising/Mislabelling (F(1, 79)=4.15, p=0.046; BCa 95% CI=-0.32 to -0.01), 
Assuming the Worst (F(1, 79)=6.07, p=0.019; BCa 95% CI=-0.39 to -0.05), 
Opposition-Defiance (F(1, 79)=13.12, p=0.001; BCa 95% CI=-0.51 to -0.15), Physical 
Aggression (F(1, 79)=4.15, p=0.048; BCa 95% CI=-0.35 to -0.01), and Stealing (F(1, 
79)=5.94, p=0.021; BCa 95% CI=-0.36 to -0.04) subscales, as well as the Overt (F(1, 
79)=9.54, p=0.004; BCa 95% CI=-0.41  to -0.10) and HIT Total (F(1, 79)=7.30, 
p=0.011; BCa 95% CI=-0.35 to -0.05) scales.  
There were no significant differences between the offenders and non-offenders 
on the Anomalous Responding (F(1, 79)=<1, p=0.602; BCa 95% CI=-0.15 to 0.26), 
and Physical Aggression subscales (F(1, 79)=2.14, p=0.146; BCa 95% CI=-0.04 to 
0.30).  However, offenders scored significantly higher on the Self Centred (F(1, 




79)=5.92, p=0.017; BCa 95% CI=0.05 to 0.38), Blaming Others (F(1, 79)=13.39, 
p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=0.13 to 0.47), Minimising/Mislabelling (F(1, 79)=3.24, 
p=0.016; BCa 95% CI=0.04 to 0.36), Assuming the Worst (F(1, 79)=5.30, p=0.025; 
BCa 95% CI=0.04 to 0.37), Opposition-Defiance (F(1, 79)=15.88, p<0.001; BCa 95% 
CI=0.18 to 0.53), Lying (F(1, 79)=10.27, p=0.04; BCa 95% CI=0.11 to 0.44), Stealing 
(F(1, 79)=5.29, p=0.028; BCa 95% CI=0.03 to 0.35) subscales, and the Overt (F(1, 
79)=9.16, p=0.003; BCa 95% CI=0.09 to 0.40), Covert (F(1, 79)=8.91, p=0.004; BCa 
95% CI=0.08 to 0.38) and HIT Total Scales (F(1, 79)=9.68, p=0.003; BCa 95% 
CI=0.08 to 0.38; Table 4).  None of the interactions between the IDs and Offence 
Factors was significant, and as a consequence, posthoc analyses of the subscales are 
not reported here; they can be found in Table 4.   
However, posthoc analyses of the total scales on the HIT indicated that the 
IDs-Group scored significantly lower than the IDs-Offender Group on the Covert 
(p=0.014; BCa 95% CI=-1.08 to -0.14), and Total HIT scales (p=0.034; BCa 95% CI=-
0.95 to -0.02).  The IDs-Group scored significantly higher than the Comparison-
Group on the Overt (p=0.002; BCa 95% CI=0.22 to 0.88) and Total HIT (p=0.029; 
BCa 95% CI=0.04 to 0.71) scales.  There were no differences between the IDs-Group 
and the Comparison-Offenders Group on the Overt, Covert or Total HIT scale 
(p>0.05).  The IDs-Offender Group and the Comparison Offender Group did not 
differ significantly on the Covert, Overt or Total HIT scales (p>0.05), while the IDs-
Offender Group scored significantly higher than the Comparison Group on the Overt 
(p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=0.53 to 1.46), Covert (p=0.003; BCa 95% CI=0.26 to 1.20), 
and Total HIT (p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=0.45 to 1.30) scale.   The Comparison-
Offenders Group scored significantly higher than the Comparison-Group on the Overt 




(p=0.015; BCa 95% CI=0.14 to 0.95), and Total HIT (p=0.033; BCa 95% CI=0.05 to 
0.81) scales (Table 4).  
Moral Reasoning 
 On the SRM-SF, the measure of moral reasoning, those with IDs scored 
significantly lower than those without IDs on Contract (F(1, 79)=120.95, p<0.001; 
BCa 95% CI=40.57 to 58.34), Truth (F(1, 77)=102.89, p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=51.56 to 
75.89), Affiliation (F(1, 79)=53.79, p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=30.41 to 52.26), Life (F(1, 
79)=50.97, p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=27.64 to 49.39), Property (F(1, 78)=73.92, 
p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=44.57 to 71.16), Law (F(1, 74)=165.65, p<0.001; BCa 95% 
CI=70.97 to 96.29), Legal Justice (F(1, 79)=207.25, p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=59.12 to 
77.39), and total SRM-SF Scores (F(1, 79)=207.91, p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=45.18 to 
59.66).  In contrast, there was no significant differences (p>0.05) between offender 
and non-offenders across all seven construct and total score.  There was a significant 
interaction between IDs and Offence regarding Contract (F(1, 79)=14.95, p<0.001; 
BCa 95% CI=-26.27 to -8.85), Truth (F(1, 77)=8.77, p=0.003; BCa 95% CI=-30.60 to 
-6.66), Affiliation (F(1, 79)=6.15, p=0.014; BCa 95% CI=-25.09 to -2.89), Life (F(1, 
79)=13.79, p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=-30.91 to -9.31), Property (F(1, 78)=17.41, 
p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=-41.52 to -14.69), Law (F(1, 74)=22.88, p<0.001; BCa 95% 
CI=-43.76 to -18.65), Legal Justice (F(1, 79)=29.11, p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=-34.97 to 
-16.58) and total SRM-SF scores (F(1, 79)=31.03, p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=-27.49 to -
13.01; Table 5). 
Insert Table 5 About Here 
Posthoc testing revealed that the IDs-Group scored significantly (p<0.05) 
lower than the IDs Offender Group on Contract, Life, Property, Law, Legal Justice, 




and total SRM-SF Scores.  However, the difference between the IDs-Group and the 
IDs-Offender Group on Truth (p=0.22; BCa 95% CI=-56.41 to 14.62) and Affiliation 
(p=0.215; BCa 95% CI=-49.84 to 10.37) was not statistically significant.   The IDs-
Group scored at stage 1(2) on Property, stage 1 on Law and stage 2(1) on Legal 
Justice, while the IDs Offender Group scored at Stage 2 across these constructs.   The 
IDs-Group also scored significantly (p<0.05) lower than the Comparison-Offenders 
and Comparison-Group on all seven constructs and the total SRM-SF score (Table 5).   
 The IDs Offender Group scored significantly (p<0.05) lower than the 
Comparison-Offenders and Comparison-Group across all seven constructs and the 
total SRM-SF score.  The IDs-Offender Group scored consistently at Stage 2 across 
constructs, while the Comparison-Offenders Group scored at Stage 2 only on 
Property, scoring at Stage 3 across the other constructs.  However, the Comparison-
Offenders Group scored significantly (p<0.05) lower than the Comparison-Group 
across all seven constructs and the total SRM-SF score (Table 5).   The Comparison-
Group scored consistently at Stage 3 across all constructs.   Examining the differences 
between the four groups with respect to total SRM-SF score indicated that the 
differences took the shape of a significant linear trend (p<0.001).  
Moral Reasoning: Controlling for Intellectual Functioning 
Given there was a positive relationship between intellectual functioning and 
moral reasoning, with intellectual functioning accounting for 74% of the variability in 
total moral reasoning score (R2 ȕ % W S BCa 95% 
CI=2.37 to 3.23), the previous analysis was repeated, controlling for scores on the 
WAIS-III.  There was no longer a significant main effect for IDs regarding Contract 
(F(1, 79)=3.35, p=0.083; BCa 95% CI=-4.64 to 42.96), Affiliation (F(1, 79)=4.89, 




p=0.079; BCa 95% CI=-2.55 to 66.27), Life (F(1, 79)=2.61, p=0.232; BCa 95% CI=-
10.10 to 56.51), Property (F(1, 78)=<1, p=0.42; BCa 95% CI=-23.31 to 51.96), or 
Law (F(1, 74)=1.04, p=0.316; BCa 95% CI=-16.71 to 55.94). The absence of a 
significant main effect for offence remained, however, with the exception of moral 
reasoning regarding the law, where offenders scored higher than non offenders (F(1, 
79)=3.30, p=0.05; BCa 95% CI=0.75 to 21.20). The significant interactions between 
factors remained, but not in relation to Contract (F(1, 79)=4.06, p=0.079; BCa 95% 
CI=-21.02 to 2.25), Truth (F(1, 77)=3.57, p=0.110; BCa 95% CI=-26.07 to 3.13), 
Affiliation (F(1, 79)=3.22, p=0.177; BCa 95% CI=-29.64 to 6.96), or Life (F(1, 
79)=6.52, p=0.06; BCa 95% CI=-34.15 to 3.14). 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
 
Posthoc analyses indicated that, when Full Scale IQ was controlled, the IDs-
Group was no longer significantly different from the IDs Offender Group on Contract 
(p=0.157; BCa 95% CI=-43.10 to 6.61), Truth (p=0.371; BCa 95% CI=-50.69 to 
20.16), or Affiliation (p=0.284; BCa 95% CI=-54.19 to 15.98).  Nor was the IDs-
Group significantly different from the Comparison-Offenders Group on Contract 
(p=0.093; BCa 95% CI=-88.19 to 10.42), Affiliation (p=0.068; BCa 95% CI=-131.17 
to 9.55), Life (p=0.136; BCa 95% CI=-124.10 to 17.29), Property (p=0.170; BCa 95% 
CI=-114.91 to 20.33), or Law (p=0.160; BCa 95% CI=-130.82 to 12.48).  There was 
no significant difference between the IDs-Group and the Comparison-Group on 
Contract (p=0.070; BCa 95% CI=-125.42 to 11.53), Affiliation (p=0.081; BCa 95% 
CI=-191.83 to 20.67), Life (p=0.139; BCa 95% CI=-183.04 to 30.97), Property 
(p=0.155; BCa 95% CI=-152.68 to 22.60), or Law (p=0.167; BCa 95% CI=-143.49 to 




15.64; Figure 1).  However, the IDs Group remained significantly different (p<0.05) 
from all other groups on Legal Justice and the total SRM-SF score. 
When Full Scale IQ was controlled, the scores of the IDs-Offender Group 
were not significantly different from those of  the Comparison Offenders Group on 
Contract (p=0.241; BCa 95% CI=-59.76 to 19.38), Truth (p=0.105; BCa 95% CI=-
109.43 to 15.28), Affiliation (p=0.123; BCa 95% CI=-97.28 to 13.43), Life (p=0.613; 
BCa 95% CI=-73.62 to 38.46), Property (p=0.869; BCa 95% CI=-54.46 to 65.14), Law 
(p=0.952; BCa 95% CI=-74.36 to 58.45) or total SRM-SF scores (p=0.128; BCa 95% 
CI=-56.72 to 7.06; Figure 1).  Nor did the IDs-Offender Group differ significantly 
from the Comparison-Group on Contract (p=0.132; BCa 95% CI=-97.59 to 19.94), 
Affiliation (p=0.124; BCa 95% CI=-158.81 to 28.88) Life (p=0.393; BCa 95% CI=-
132.73 to 51.04), Property (p=0.834; BCa 95% CI=-92.20 to 66.54), Law (p=0.821; 
BCa 95% CI=-87.07 to 61.79) or the total SRM-SF score (p=0.064; BCa 95% CI=-
99.06 to 4.88) (Figure 1).  However, the IDs-Offender Group remained significantly 
different (p<0.05) from all other groups on Legal Justice. 
When Full Scale IQ was controlled, the Comparison-Offenders Group was not 
significantly different from the Comparison-Group on Contract (p=0.202; BCa 95% 
CI=-53.88 to 14.76), Truth (p=0.137; BCa 95% CI=--70.19 to 12.05), Affiliation 
(p=0.273; BCa 95% CI=-82.94 to 27.49), Life (p=0.303; BCa 95% CI=-78.40 to 
27.01), Property (p=0.535; BCa 95% CI=-59.50 to 27.67), Law (p=0.726; BCa 95% 
CI=-44.88 to 30.42), or total SRM-SF score (p=0.130; BCa 95% CI=-52.96 to 10.35; 
Figure 1).  The differences between the four groups on the total SRM-SF score took 
the shape of a significant linear trend (p=0.002).  Both the Comparison-Offenders 
Group and the Comparison Group were significantly different (p<0.05) from all other 
groups on Legal Justice.  These results indicate that, with the exception of Legal 




Justice, some of the differences between the four groups can be accounted for by 
differences in intellectual functioning.    
Mediation 
Initially, correlations (two-tailed) between moral reasoning (SRM-SF total 
score), cognition distortions (HIT Scale) and empathy (BEI) were examined.  There 
was a significant positive relationship between moral reasoning and empathy 
(r(80)=0.33, p=0.002), and significant negative relationships between moral reasoning 
and cognitive distortions (r(80)=-0.43, p<0.001), and empathy and cognitive 
distortions (r(80)=-0.25, p=0.025).   
Investigating the relationships between moral reasoning, cognitive distortions 
and empathy indicated empathy significantly predicted both cognitive distortions 
(p=0.0249), and moral reasoning (p=0.0024).  Moral reasoning also significantly 
predicted cognitive distortions, controlling for empathy (p=0.0007).  The indirect 
effect was significant (z=-2.37, p=0.0177) and this was confirmed by the results using 
the bootstrapping (95% BCa CI=-0.0601 to -0.0092; Table 6).   
Insert Table 6 About Here 
  





The results of the current study demonstrated that the moral reasoning of the 
IDs-Offender Group was more mature than that of the IDs-Group. The moral 
reasoning of the Comparison-Offender Group was more developed than that of the 
IDs-Offender Group, but less mature than that of the Comparison Group.  The global 
moral reasoning scores across these four groups approximated a linear trend, even 
when intelligence had been controlled.   Nevertheless, both groups of men with IDs 
were reasoning at global stage 2, while both groups of men without IDs were 
reasoning at global stage 3.    
The analysis suggested that there was no significant difference in emotional 
empathy between the two groups of men with IDs, but that the IDs-Group had more 
limited empathy than the Comparison Group and the IDs-Offender Group had more 
limited empathy than either of the groups of men without learning disabilities.  IDs-
Offender Group had significantly less emotional empathy than both the Comparison-
Offender and Comparison Groups, but there was no difference between the IDs-
Offender and IDs Group.  The IDs-Group also had more limited empathy than the 
Comparison Group.  These results contrast with those of Proctor and Beail (2007) 
who suggested that offenders with IDs have better empathy and theory of mind skills 
than non-offenders.  However, Woodbury-Smith et al. (2005) reported findings 
similar to those of the current study.  They found there was no difference in the scores 
of offenders and non-offenders with high functioning autistic spectrum conditions on  
theory of mind and emotional recognition tasks. They did, though, report that 
performance on these tasks, together with more limited intellectual ability, was 
associated with an increased likelihood of being in their offender group.  It is 




important to note, however, that the current study focussed on men with IDs, rather 
than men and women with high functioning autism.  
Turning to cognitive distortions, men with IDs scored higher on the measure 
of distorted cognitions than those without IDs, and offenders scored higher than non-
offenders, with distorted cognitions being highest amongst offenders with IDs.   The 
findings are consistent with those from studies involving sexual offenders with IDs  
(Broxholme & Lindsay, 2003; Langdon, Maxted, Murphy, & SOTSEC-ID, 2007; 
Langdon & Talbot, 2006; Lindsay & Michie, 2004; Lindsay et al., 2006; Lindsay, 
Whitefield, & Carson, 2007; Murphy, Powell, Guzman, & Hays, 2007; Talbot & 
Langdon, 2006).  However, this is the first study we know of in which the likelihood 
of endorsing cognitive distortions has been investigated in men with IDs who have 
been convicted of other offences.  
Turning to our hypothesis which predicted that the IDs-Group would score 
lower on the measure of moral reasoning than the IDs-Offender Group, while the 
Comparison-Offender Group would score lower than the Comparison Group, the 
results indicated that the differences between the groups were as predicted. 
Controlling for intelligence in the analysis indicated that the total moral reasoning 
score of the IDs-Offender Group was no longer significantly different from the 
Comparison-Offenders Group, while that of the Comparison-Offenders Group was no 
longer significantly different from the Comparison Group.  This suggests that some of 
the differences between the groups can be accounted for by intelligence.  Langdon et 
al. (2010b) also demonstrated that many of the differences between men with and 
without IDs, with no known history of arrests, cautions or convictions could be 
accounted for by intelligence.  In their study, intelligence accounted for all the 
differences between the two groups with the exception of moral reasoning in relation 




to the law and overall SRM-SF score.   Nevertheless, even when IQ was controlled, 
the four groups differed significantly on Legal Justice. This finding may be related to 
the finding that there is intergenerational transmission of offending in men 
(Farrington, Coid, & Murray, 2009)and requires more detailed examination.  
In this study, we found that the moral reasoning of both groups of men with 
IDs fell at Stage 2 overall, yet one group had a documented history of criminal 
offending, while the other had no history of criminal offending.  This finding may be 
accounted for by the differences between the groups across the seven constructs 
measured by the SRM-SF.  Specifically, the IDs-Group demonstrated less mature 
reasoning in relation to Property, Law and Legal Justice.  This finding is consistent 
with that of  Langdon et al. (2010b).  It suggests moral judgement within these areas 
is based upon the avoidance of punishment and unilateral authority.  As expected 
from the literature relating to young offenders (Blasi, 1980; Campagna & Harter, 
1975; Chandler & Moran, 1990; Gavaghan, Arnold, & Gibbs, 1983; Gregg, Gibbs, & 
Basinger, 1994; Nelson et al., 1990; Trevethan & Walker, 1989), the IDs-Offender 
Group demonstrated reasoning at Stage 2 in relation to these three constructs,. In 
contrast, the Comparison-Offenders Group demonstrated Stage 2 moral reasoning 
only on Property, scoring at Stage 3 across the other constructs, while the 
Comparison-Group scored at Stage 3 across all the constructs. 
Our findings in relation to offenders without IDs are not entirely consistent 
with the moral reasoning literature relating to young offenders.  Gibbs (2003) 
comments that many studies have demonstrated that young offenders tend to make 
more use of Stage 2 moral reasoning with regards to concepts such as legal justice and 
the law (Blasi, 1980; Campagna & Harter, 1975; Chandler & Moran, 1990; Gavaghan 
et al., 1983; Gregg et al., 1994; Nelson et al., 1990; Trevethan & Walker, 1989). In 




contrast, young people who are not offenders tend to give Stage 3 reasons for obeying 
the law (Gibbs, 2003, 2010).  Although the Comparison-Offenders Group in our study 
had significantly lower scores on the test of moral reasoning than the Comparison-
Group, our findings are not consistent with this literature, because on average, the 
Comparison-Offenders Group was reasoning at Stage 3. It is important to note, 
though, that our offenders were adults, rather than young offenders.   Such findings 
are consistent with Stevenson et al. (2003), who also found that adult offenders tend 
to be reasoning at Stage 3.    
In relation to men with IDs who are offenders, however, our findings are 
consistent with the literature relating to young offenders.  The IDs-Offender Group 
was consistently reasoning at stage 2 across all constructs.  Furthermore, the findings 
suggest that non-offenders with IDs were reasoning at stage 1, and therefore appealing 
to unilateral authority and avoidance of punishment when making moral judgements 
in relation to the law.  This may explain why, as a group, they had no history of 
arrests, cautions or convictions, considering that their total moral reasoning score fell 
at stage 2.  
Our findings have substantial clinical implications for men with IDs.  Langdon 
et al. (2011) pointed out that the relationship between moral development and social 
perspective-taking provides a rationale for the effectiveness of group-based 
interventions over individual treatments, as groups offer more opportunities for social 
perspective-taking.   Gibbs and his colleagues (2003, 2010; Gibbs et al., 1995) argued 
that proximal, as well as distal interventions, are required when offering clinical 
interventions to young offenders on the grounds that moral reasoning abilities are 
distal schema within the context of a social situation.  Cognitive distortions and social 
skills, which are proximal, also need to be targeted to ensure that interventions are 




effective.    In an attempt to address this issue, Gibbs and colleagues (Gibbs, Potter, 
Barriga, & Liau, 1996; Gibbs et al., 1995; Potter, Gibbs, & Goldstein, 2001) 
developed the Equipping Youth to Help One Another Programme (EQUIP) which has 
been shown to be effective at reducing misconduct and recidivism rates (Leeman, 
Gibbs, & Fuller, 1993). 
Given the evidence that the moral reasoning abilities of offenders with IDs are 
comparable to those of young offenders, the question of whether or not the EQUIP 
programme is likely to be an effective treatment for this population requires 
investigation.  In view of the strong relationship between intelligence and moral 
development,  Langdon et al. (2010a) considered whether or not people with IDs 
would be able to reach the developmentally more mature moral reasoning stages that 
are protective against illegal behaviour.  The findings from the current study indicate 
that men with IDs with no history of illegal behaviour are reasoning at Stage 1 in 
relation to Property, Law and Legal Justice, while offenders with IDs are reasoning at 
Stage 2.   Therefore, an alternative therapeutic approach may be to encourage moral 
reasoning that appeals to unilateral authority and avoidance of punishment.  It would, 
however, make sense to examine whether or not EQUIP can bring about 
developmental shifts to mature moral reasoning amongst offenders with IDs before 
endorsing such a strategy. 
Our findings suggest that the relationship between empathy and distorted 
cognitions is mediated by moral reasoning. This was investigated because both Gibbs 
(2003, 2010) and Hoffman (2000) argue that cognition serves to augment empathic 
states.  Hoffman argues that empathy is the primary motivator of moral behaviour and 
is affected by moral reasoning, while Gibbs argues that moral reasoning and empathy 
are both motivators of moral behaviour, with empathy influenced by distorted 




cognitions, arising from maladaptive moral schema.    The findings from this study 
indicate that the relationship between empathy and distorted cognitions is mediated by 
moral reasoning.  From a theoretical perspective, this makes sense, since distorted 
cognitions reflect moral schema and therefore the relationship between empathy and 
distorted cognitions would occur through moral reasoning.  While the findings of our 
mediation analysis are consistent with both Hoffman (2000) and Gibbs (2003, 2010), 
because of the emphasis that each places on affect empathy, the analysis is in no way 
a test of whether or not empathy alone or empathy and moral principles motivate 
moral behaviour;  further research is needed.  
There are some limitations with the current study that need to be highlighted.   
Since some of the participants were in custodial facilities, it is likely that they 
received some sort of intervention for their offending behaviour.  This may have 
affected their moral reasoning. It was impossible to control for this in the analysis, 
because of such marked variability in the programmes available in prisons and 
hospitals, and, moreover, in what is offered to offenders with different index offences.   
It is also the case that offenders who volunteered to take part in this study may have 
different moral reasoning and empathy abilities than those who did not volunteer.  It is 
also important to mention that IQ of men with IDs included within this study is 
necessarily restricted. Finally, the internal consistency of the empathy measure used 
within this study is problematic, and some further work is needed regarding the 
development of measures of empathy for offenders with intellectual and other 
developmental disabilities.  
In conclusion, the results indicate that the moral reasoning abilities of 
offenders with IDs are developmentally delayed and that the relationship between 
empathy and distorted cognitions is mediated by moral reasoning.  Future research 




should focus on whether or not clinical interventions for offenders with IDs, based 
upon moral development theory, are effective.   
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Level and Stage Description 
Level 1: Immature 
Stage 1: Unilateral and Physicalistic 
 
Moral justifications are based upon unilateral 
authority and rule based, or related to punitive 
consequences of the violation of rules.    
Stage 2: Exchanging and Instrumental Moral justifications based upon an 
understanding that has arisen from social 
interaction.   For example, decisions to help 
others may be justified because that person 
may help you in the future.  However, 
justifications remain superficial. 
Level 2: Mature 
Stage 3: Mutual and Prosocial 
 
Moral justifications are characterised by further 
decentration, and are based upon a prosocial 
understanding of emotional states (e.g. 
empathy), care and good conduct.   
Stage 4: Systemic and Standard 
 
Further maturity is indexed by the development 
of an understanding of the complex social 
structures in which we live.  Justifications are 
also based upon constructs such as rights, 
values and character within society.  Other 
justifications may be based upon social justice 
and responsibility or conscience.    
 
  





The relationship between scores on the Sociomoral Reflection Measure ± Short Form (SRM-
SF) and moral stages.  
Score Moral Stage 
100 to 125 Stage 1 
126 to 149 Transition Stage 1(2) 
150 to 174 Transition Stage 2(1) 
175 to 225  Stage 2 
226 to 249 Transition Stage 2(3) 
250 to 274 Transition Stage 3(2) 
275 to 325 Stage 3 
326 to 349 Transition Stage 3(4) 
350 to 374 Transition Stage 4(3) 
375 to 400 Stage 4 
 
  





 The original modified items of the Bryant Empathy Index.  
Original Items Modified Items 
,WPDNHVPHVDGWRVHHDJLUOZKRFDQ¶WILQGDQ\RQHWRSOD\ZLWK 1. It makes me sad to see an elderly woman who has no one to talk to 
2. People who kiss and hug in public are silly 2. People who kiss and hug in public are silly. 
3*. Boys who cry because they are happy are silly. 3. Men who cry because they are happy are silly.  
,UHDOO\OLNHWRZDWFKSHRSOHRSHQSUHVHQWVHYHQZKHQ,GRQ¶WJHWDSUHVHQW
myself. 
,UHDOO\OLNHWRZDWFKSHRSOHRSHQSUHVHQWVHYHQZKHQ,GRQ¶Wget a present 
myself. 
5*. Seeing a boy who is crying makes me feel like crying. 5.  Seeing a man who is crying makes me feel like crying.  
6. I get upset when I see a girl being hurt. 6. I get upset when I see a girl being hurt.  
(YHQZKHQ,GRQ¶WNQow why someone is laughing, I laugh too.  (YHQZKHQ,GRQ¶WNQRZZK\VRPHRQHLVODXJKLQJ,ODXJKWRR 
8. Sometimes I cry when I watch TV. 8. Sometimes I cry when I watch TV. 
9.* Girls who cry because they are happy are silly.  9. Women who cry because they are happy are silly. 
,W¶VKDUGIRUPHWRVHHZK\VRPHRQHHOVHJHWVXSVHW ,W¶VKDUGIRUPHWRVHHZK\VRPHRQHHOVHJHWVXSVHW 
11. I get upset when I see an animal being hurt.  11. I get upset when I see an animal being hurt. 
12*. It makeVPHVDGWRVHHDER\ZKRFDQ¶WILQGDQ\RQHWRSOD\ZLWK 12. It makes me sad to see an elderly man who has no one to talk to. 
13. Some songs make me feel so sad I feel like crying.  13. Some songs make me feel so sad I feel like crying. 




14. I get upset when I see a boy being hurt.  14. I get upset when I see a boy being hurt. 
15*. Grown-ups sometimes cry even when they have nothing to be sad about.  15. Adults sometimes cry even when they have nothing to be sad about.  
,W¶VVLOO\WRWUHDWGRJVDQG cats as though they have feelings like people.  ,W¶VVLOO\WRWUHDWGRJVDQGFDWVDVWKRXJKWKH\KDYHIHHOLQJVOLNHSHRSOH 
17*. I get mad when I see a classmate pretending to need help from the teacher 
all the time.  
17. I get angry when I see someone pretending they need help all the time.  
.LGVZKRKDYHQRIULHQGVSUREDEO\GRQ¶WZDQWDQ\ 3HRSOHZKRKDYHQRIULHQGVSUREDEO\GRQ¶WZDQWDQ\ 
19*. Seeing a girl who is crying makes me feel like crying.  19. Seeing a woman who is crying makes me feel like crying.  
20. I think it is funny that some people cry during a sad movie or while reading 
a sad book. 
20. I think it is funny that some people cry during a sad movie or while reading 
a sad book. 
21*. I am able to eat all my cookies even when I see someone looking at me 
wanting one.  
21. I am able to eat all my biscuits even when I see someone looking at me 
wanting one. 
,GRQ¶WIHHOXSVHWZKHQ,VHHDFODVVPDWHEHLQJSXQLVKHGE\DWHDFKHUIRU
not obeying school rules.  
,GRQ¶WIHel upset when I see someone being punished for breaking the 
rules.  
*item has been modified




Table 4:  Descriptive statistics for empathy and cognitive distortions for men with and without IDs and offenders and non-offenders.  






 Post-hoc Tests 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD  
Age 45.35 16.58 33.60 7.54 38.80 15.20 37.05* 7.88 IDs>IDs-O**; IDs>C* 
Offence Severity (Rank)   20.83 12.47 20.18 10.86 - -  
WAIS-III Full Scale IQ 58.80 5.87 62.90 5.22 89.50 11.12 103.25 5.67 IDs<IDs-O*; IDs<CO***; IDs<C***; IDs-O<CO***; IDs-O<C***; CO<C*** 
Bryant Empathy Index 14.65 2.85 13.55 3.62 16.90 2.65 16.00 2.91 IDs<CO*; IDs-O<CO**; IDs-O<C* 
How I Think Questionnaire 
(M Scores) 
        
 
Anomalous Responding 3.05 0.84 3.29 1.12 3.56 0.99 3.59 0.72  
Self-Centred 2.07 0.67 2.56 0.97 2.26 0.78 1.91 0.59 IDs-O>C* 
Blaming Others 2.44 0.73 3.12 0.94 2.36 0.72 1.81 0.56 IDs<IDs-O*; IDs>C**; IDs-O>CO**; IDs-O>C***; CO>C* 
Minimising Mislabelling 2.04 0.59 2.49 0.86 2.11 0.86 1.76 0.52 IDs-O>C** 
Asssuming the Worst 2.20 0.60 2.47 1.03 2.17 0.75 1.65 0.63 IDs>C**; IDs-O>C**; CO>C * 
Opposition-Defiance 2.50 0.59 3.26 1.05 2.57 0.94 1.88 0.51 IDs<IDs-O**; IDs<CO; IDs>C**; IDs-O>CO*; IDs-O>C***; CO>C** 
Physical Aggression 2.09 0.75 2.16 0.97 1.99 0.79 1.55 0.56 IDs>C*; IDs-O>C*; CO>C* 
Lying 2.09 0.52 2.91 1.10 2.49 0.77 2.21 0.55 IDs<IDs-O**; IDs-O>C* 
Stealing 2.01 0.58 2.40 0.97 1.99 0.72 1.63 0.56 IDs>C*; IDs-O>C** 
Overt Scale 2.29 0.57 2.70 0.91 2.28 0.81 1.73 0.50 IDs>C**; IDs-O>C***; CO>C* 
Covert Scale 2.05 0.52 2.64 0.90 2.22 0.65 1.92 0.54 IDs<IDs-O*; IDs-O>C** 
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Table 5: Moral reasoning scores for  men with and without IDs and offenders and non-offenders.  
 
  






 Post-hoc Tests 
Sociomoral Reflection 
Measure  ?Short Form         
 
Contract 204.17 46.79 229.17 30.52 293.33 46.01 337.92 35.20 
IDs<IDs-O*; IDs<CO***; IDs<C***; IDs-
O<CO***; IDs-O<C***; CO<C** 
Truth 175.00 55.01 197.37 56.45 287.50 60.43 339.47 48.81 
IDs<CO***; IDs<C***; IDs-O<CO***; IDs-
O<C***; CO<C** 
Affliation 211.25 53.48 231.25 46.51 286.33 56.83 322.50 45.09 
IDs<CO***; IDs<C***; IDs-O<CO***; IDs-
O<C***; CO<C* 
Life 206.25 58.98 247.50 39.65 285.08 58.50 325.25 33.85 
IDs<IDs-O*; IDs<CO***; IDs<C***; IDs-O<CO*; 
IDs-O<C***; CO<C* 
Property 140.00 57.58 205.00 4840 265.00 69.02 313.16 64.21 
IDs<IDs-O**; IDs<CO***; IDs<C***; IDs-
O<CO**; IDs-O<C***; CO<C* 
Law 122.50 34.31 186.84 36.67 292.50 83.15 353.13 56.18 
IDs<IDs-O***; IDs<CO***; IDs<C***; IDs-
O<CO***; IDs-O<C***; CO<C* 
Legal Justice 167.50 40.64 225.00 42.87 310.53 48.82 355.56 29.15 
IDs<IDs-O***; IDs<CO***; IDs<C***; IDs-
O<CO***; IDs-O<C***; CO<C** 
Total Score 186.59 33.35 224.37 27.64 288.70 36.85 331.92 31.53 
IDs<IDs-O**; IDs<CO***; IDs<C***; IDs-




        
 





















Sociomoral Reflection Measure - Short Form
Figure 1: Adjusted means (SEM) on the Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form 
controlling for Full Scale IQ by Group.
IDs Group (Covariate IQ)
IDs-Offender (Covariate IQ)
Comparison-Offender Group (Covariate IQ)
Comparison Group (Covariate IQ)




A mediation analysis demonstrating that the relationship between empathy and distorted cognitions is mediated by moral reasoning.  Using 



















B SE t p 
a 6.698 2.137 3.13 0.0024 
b -0.004 0.001 -3.55 0.0007 
c -0.056 0.024 -2.29 0.0249 
Đ ? -0.027 0.024 -1.12 0.2649 
 B SE z p 
Indirect Effect -0.029 0.012 -2.37 0.0177 
 Lower BCa 95% CI Upper BCa 95% CI 
Indirect Effect 
(Bootstrap) 
-0.0601           -0.0092 
 
a b 
Đ ? 
